

**National Interagency Coordination Center**  
**Incident Management Situation Report**  
**Friday, October 19, 2018 – 0800 MT**  
**National Preparedness Level 1**

**National Fire Activity**

Initial Attack Activity:	Light (60) new fires
New large incidents:	3
Large fires contained:	1
Uncontained large fires:**	2
Area Command teams committed:	0
NIMOs committed:	1
Type 1 IMTs committed:	3
Type 2 IMTs committed:	2

\*\*Uncontained large fires include only fires being managed under a full suppression strategy.

[Link](#) to Geographic Area daily reports.

In support of Hurricane Michael, IMT 1 (Leneave) has mobilized to Bay County, Florida.

In support of Hurricane Michael, IMT 2 (Goff) has mobilized to Jacksonville, Florida.

Active Incident Resource Summary						
GACC	Incidents	Cumulative Acres	Crews	Engines	Helicopters	Total Personnel
AICC	0	0	0	0	0	0
NWCC	5	230,647	14	41	5	793
ONCC	1	3,889	3	7	0	78
OSCC	0	0	0	0	0	0
NRCC	0	0	0	0	0	0
GBCC	1	9,196	0	0	0	0
SWCC	0	0	0	0	0	0
RMCC	1	20,120	0	0	0	6
EACC	0	0	0	0	0	0
SACC	6	130	38	60	0	1,308
<b>Total</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>263,982</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>108</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>2,185</b>

**Southern Area (PL 2)**

New fires:	6
New large incidents:	2
Uncontained large fires:	0
NIMOs committed:	1
Type 1 IMTs committed:	2

\* **FNF Hurricane Michael – Roads**, National Forests in Florida. IMT 1 (Dueitt). Personnel assessing and repairing damage to trails, roads, infrastructure and recreation areas managed by the Apalachicola NF. Road, area and trail closures in effect.

**Hurricane Michael**, Florida Forest Service. Florida IMT 1 (Mousel) has mobilized to Niceville, FL. IMT is also managing the Chipola Support incident. Personnel are providing logistical support. Area and road closures in effect.

\* **Chipola Support**, Florida Forest Service. Personnel are coordinating repair and recovery efforts and wildfire response . Road closures in effect.

**Hurricane Florence**, National Forests in North Carolina. NIMO (Houseman). Personnel assessing and repairing damage to trails, roads and recreation areas managed by the Croatan NF. Road, area, and trail closures in effect.

**Hurricane Michael GEMA**, Georgia Forestry Commission. Personnel providing logistical support and clearing of roadways. Road closures in effect.

Incident Name	Unit	Size		%	Ctn/ Comp	Est	Personnel		Resources			Strc Lost	\$\$ CTD	Origin Own
		Acres	Chge				Total	Chge	Crw	Eng	Heli			
* FNF Hurricane Michael – Roads	FL-FNF	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	UNK	60	---	0	0	0	0	156K	FS
Hurricane Michael	FL-FLS	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	UNK	593	-908	0	55	0	8,091	19.1M	ST
* Chipola Support	FL-FLS	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	10/24	122	---	4	5	0	0	230K	ST
Hurricane Florence	NC-NCF	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	11/30	57	5	0	0	0	0	800K	FS
Hurricane Michael GEMA	GA-GAS	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	10/22	125	-350	7	0	0	0	670K	ST

### Northwest Area (PL 1)

New fires:	7
New large incidents:	1
Uncontained large fires:	2
Type 2 IMTs committed:	1

**Klondike**, Rogue River-Siskiyou NF. IMT 2 (Knerr). Nine miles northwest of Selma, OR. Timber and brush. Active fire behavior with uphill runs, torching and flanking. Numerous structures threatened. Evacuations, road, area and trail closures in effect.

**Stukel**, Lakeview District, BLM. Eleven miles southeast of Klamath Falls, OR. Brush and tall grass. Minimal fire behavior. Area closures in effect.

Incident Name	Unit	Size		%	Ctn/ Comp	Est	Personnel		Resources			Strc Lost	\$\$ CTD	Origin Own
		Acres	Chge				Total	Chge	Crw	Eng	Heli			
Klondike	OR-RSF	173,069	272	72	Ctn	10/31	614	95	9	27	5	0	93.6M	FS
Stukel	OR-LAD	518	0	90	Ctn	10/20	132	0	5	9	0	0	895K	BLM
* Red	OR-MAR	2,303	---	100	Ctn	---	5	---	0	1	0	0	15K	FWS

MAR – Malheur National Wildlife Refuge, FWS

**Fires and Acres Yesterday (by Protection):**

Area		BIA	BLM	FWS	NPS	ST/OT	USFS	TOTAL
Alaska Area	FIREs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	ACRES	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Northwest Area	FIREs	0	0	0	0	5	2	7
	ACRES	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Northern California Area	FIREs	0	0	0	0	7	0	7
	ACRES	0	0	0	0	4	0	4
Southern California Area	FIREs	0	0	0	0	13	4	17
	ACRES	0	0	0	0	3	65	68
Northern Rockies Area	FIREs	0	0	0	0	2	3	5
	ACRES	0	0	0	0	0	6	6
Great Basin Area	FIREs	0	3	0	1	4	7	15
	ACRES	0	36	0	0	32	9	77
Southwest Area	FIREs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	ACRES	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rocky Mountain Area	FIREs	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
	ACRES	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eastern Area	FIREs	0	0	0	0	2	0	2
	ACRES	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Southern Area	FIREs	0	0	0	0	6	0	6
	ACRES	0	0	0	0	108	0	108
<b>TOTAL FIRES:</b>		0	3	0	1	39	17	60
<b>TOTAL ACRES:</b>		0	36	0	0	147	80	263

### Fire and Acres Year-to-Date (by Protection):

Area		BIA	BLM	FWS	NPS	ST/OT	USFS	TOTAL
Alaska Area	FIREs	0	120	0	0	202	32	354
	ACRES	0	362,459	0	0	46,024	63	408,546
Northwest Area	FIREs	301	250	31	36	1,938	907	3,463
	ACRES	25,350	341,391	51,113	4,332	299,079	489,268	1,210,533
Northern California Area	FIREs	70	21	3	34	2,626	431	3,185
	ACRES	3,707	2,886	7	42,981	747,719	522,252	1,319,552
Southern California Area	FIREs	46	75	5	56	3,341	399	3,922
	ACRES	907	1,516	5	11,917	43,151	159,630	217,126
Northern Rockies Area	FIREs	811	57	4	17	810	462	2,161
	ACRES	7,413	929	2,938	20,150	20,655	76,475	128,560
Great Basin Area	FIREs	39	915	4	36	1,054	532	2,580
	ACRES	16,812	1,114,612	0	863	472,141	613,594	2,218,022
Southwest Area	FIREs	701	240	9	58	809	1,283	3,100
	ACRES	33,066	5,476	426	17,630	293,445	174,544	524,587
Rocky Mountain Area	FIREs	426	528	10	37	920	477	2,398
	ACRES	4,244	141,666	1,614	282	377,591	213,060	738,457
Eastern Area	FIREs	464	0	19	27	4,371	368	5,249
	ACRES	4,155	0	1,035	190	27,678	7,241	40,299
Southern Area	FIREs	442	67	41	59	22,634	349	23,592
	ACRES	118,199	310	8,682	20,931	1,172,866	29,312	1,350,300
<b>TOTAL FIRES:</b>		<b>3,300</b>	<b>2,273</b>	<b>126</b>	<b>360</b>	<b>38,705</b>	<b>5,240</b>	<b>50,004</b>
<b>TOTAL ACRES:</b>		<b>213,853</b>	<b>1,971,245</b>	<b>65,820</b>	<b>119,276</b>	<b>3,500,348</b>	<b>2,285,438</b>	<b>8,155,979</b>

Ten Year Average Fires (2008 – 2017 as of today)	54,268
Ten Year Average Acres (2008 – 2017 as of today)	6,096,190

**Prescribed Fires and Acres Yesterday (by Ownership):**

Area		BIA	BLM	FWS	NPS	ST/OT	USFS	TOTAL
Alaska Area	FIREs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	ACRES	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Northwest Area	FIREs	0	1	2	0	1	4	8
	ACRES	50	18	12	0	4	860	944
Northern California Area	FIREs	0	0	0	1	0	5	6
	ACRES	0	0	0	50	50	571	671
Southern California Area	FIREs	0	0	2	0	0	1	3
	ACRES	0	0	1,212	0	0	70	1,282
Northern Rockies Area	FIREs	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
	ACRES	0	0	0	0	0	38	38
Great Basin Area	FIREs	0	0	1	0	0	4	5
	ACRES	0	0	1,450	0	0	1,171	2,621
Southwest Area	FIREs	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
	ACRES	0	0	0	0	0	202	202
Rocky Mountain Area	FIREs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	ACRES	0	0	0	0	0	15	15
Eastern Area	FIREs	0	0	1	0	0	1	2
	ACRES	0	0	67	0	0	50	117
Southern Area	FIREs	0	0	0	0	29	0	29
	ACRES	0	0	0	0	1,125	0	1,125
<b>TOTAL FIRES:</b>		<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>59</b>
<b>TOTAL ACRES:</b>		<b>50</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>2,741</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>1,178.8</b>	<b>2,977</b>	<b>7,015</b>

### Prescribed Fires and Acres Year-to-Date (by Ownership)

Areas		BIA	BLM	FWS	NPS	ST/OT	USFS	TOTAL
Alaska Area	FIREs	0	0	3	0	11	1	15
	ACRES	0	0	56	0	36,158	70	36,284
Northwest Area	FIREs	36	43	32	9	4	213	337
	ACRES	9,790	6,209	5,196	416	61	55,951	77,623
Northern California Area	FIREs	4	3	10	18	1	142	178
	ACRES	184	1,792	5,742	2,051	85	20,358	30,212
Southern California Area	FIREs	0	2	11	2	0	132	147
	ACRES	0	90	3,737	48	0	12,932	16,807
Northern Rockies Area	FIREs	12	17	42	6	22	240	339
	ACRES	3,766	12,536	11,226	12,212	987	25,739	66,466
Great Basin Area	FIREs	2	21	6	5	32	89	155
	ACRES	75	2,322	3,490	1,867	2,454	25,897	36,105
Southwest Area	FIREs	18	15	7	4	8	172	224
	ACRES	4,183	12,963	204	836	804	91,126	110,116
Rocky Mountain Area	FIREs	43	40	32	10	106	121	352
	ACRES	4,768	4,490	19,015	308	10,625	48,580	87,786
Eastern Area	FIREs	57	0	236	32	1,144	264	1,733
	ACRES	32,016	0	30,115	7,671	119,235	73,875	262,912
Southern Area	FIREs	77	0	167	29	82,820	1,001	84,094
	ACRES	19,170	0	141,226	120,642	2,800,633	977,462	4,059,133
<b>TOTAL FIRES:</b>		<b>249</b>	<b>141</b>	<b>546</b>	<b>115</b>	<b>84,148</b>	<b>2,375</b>	<b>87,574</b>
<b>TOTAL ACRES:</b>		<b>73,952</b>	<b>40,402</b>	<b>220,007</b>	<b>146,051</b>	<b>2,971,042</b>	<b>1,331,990</b>	<b>4,783,444</b>

\*\*\* Changes in some agency YTD acres reflect more accurate mapping or reporting adjustments.

\*\*\*Additional wildfire information is available through the Geographic Areas at <http://gacc.nifc.gov/>

**Predictive Service Discussion:** Santa Ana winds will begin to redevelop over Southern California as another low pressure area develops over northern portions of the Baja Peninsula. To the north, the high pressure ridge along the West Coast will move on shore and into the Pacific Northwest. This will set up a blocking pattern that will persist for several days and lead to warm and dry conditions along and West of the Continental Divide. A cold front moving east from the Great Plains will lead to scattered showers and storms across the Great Lakes and also across western portions of the South. Florida should remain mostly dry however.

<http://www.predictiveservices.nifc.gov/outlooks/outlooks.htm>



**This Day in History** is a brief summary of a powerful learning opportunity and is not intended to second guess or be judgmental of decisions and actions. Put yourself in the following situation as if you do not know what the outcome will be. What are the conditions? What are you thinking? What are YOU doing?

## The Pepper Hill Fire – October 19<sup>th</sup>, 1938 - Pennsylvania

**Incident Summary:** Most of north-central Pennsylvania had been extensively logged by large timber companies from 1890-1930. By 1938, fuels in the area consisted of very young second-growth hardwoods, ericaceous shrubs and logging slash. Following an unusually hot and dry summer, a killing frost on October 7<sup>th</sup> caused the foliage to cure. Precipitation for the past three months had been substantially below normal. High temperatures persisted in the 80's with RH's of 20-25%.

At 11:10am on October 19<sup>th</sup>, 1938, the Hunts Run Civilian Conservation Corp (CCC) Camp #S-132 is notified of a possible forest fire. Upon investigation, several fires are located on Pepper Hill Mountain. 2 CCC crews are dispatched to the fires. Both crews had just returned from a fire only hours before, and many enrollees requested to stay behind due to fatigue. All enrollees were ordered to go. The two CCC crews began initial attack from both flanks of the fire, anchoring into a nearby road. Both crews began constructing line from the heel of the fire to the top, burning out as needed. For reasons which are still not clear, crew 2 was ordered to abandon their firing operation on the right flank and proceed to the head of the fire to construct direct downhill line. The crew was  $\frac{3}{4}$  of the way up Pepper Hill Mountain when the fire below made a rapid run that overtook them. A few were able to find safety atop large nearby rocks, the remaining crew was severely burned, and ultimately eight of the young CCC enrollees would lose their lives.

### Discussion Points:

**Training** – Most of the CCC enrollees received little or no formal training. They were expected to learn what to do on the job.

- Most of us will work with new firefighters who have little or no experience. It is not reasonable or safe to assume they will learn everything on the fireline. How will your crew prepare new members for success?

**Fatigue** – Many of the enrollees assigned to the Pepper Hill Fire had just returned to camp from other fires at 5:30am that morning.

- Though we now have work/rest guidelines to help prevent fatigue, a long fire season can still take its toll on even the fittest firefighter. What signs might we see in our crewmembers that could indicate fatigue?
- What impact can fatigue have on your crew, and what can you do to lessen the associated risks?


**Tactics** – The original plan to use the road as an anchor point seems sound, but poor choices were made on the right flank when the crew moved to the head and abandoned their burnout.

- Without aviation support, would your crew engage this fire? If so, how?
- Though not a sound decision at Pepper Hill, describe conditions where attacking the head of a fire could be a viable tactic, while ensuring safety.

**Crew Cohesion** – The CCC Enrollees had not worked many fires together. On their way up the hill, they became separated due to differences in physical ability.

There were no indications that there crew leader gave them any direction during this critical time.

- No firefighter intends to get into a bad situation. We all train to avoid them, but “what if”? How would you and your crew manage the safety of all firefighters if faced with a similar situation?



Have an idea? Have feedback? Share it.